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ABSTRACT: The International Court of Justice, in its 2012 judgment 
in the Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 
(Belgium v. Senegal) case, found that belgium had ius standi to 
claim Senegal’s responsibility for the alleged breach of its obliga-
tions under Articles 6(2) and 7(1) of the Convention Against Torture 
and that such claims were admissible. Also, it concluded that it was 
not necessary to determine whether belgium was ‘specially affec-
ted’ or ‘injured’. The Court based these findings on the concept of 
‘obligations erga omnes partes’, which it defined as obligations in 
the compliance of which states have an ‘interest’, which, in the case 
of the above provisions is a ‘common interest’. Several members of 
the Court rejected the above findings as inconsistent with the law 
of international responsibility, and state practice and, for other rea-
sons, ill-grounded. The present paper assesses the Court’s definition 
and use of the concept of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ in light 
of public international law. It also analyses the views expressed by 
other judges sitting on the bench for the case. The present paper’s 
main contentions are three. first, the characterisation of obligations 
in the performance of which all the states parties to a treaty have 
an ‘interest’ -arguably a ‘common’ one- as ‘obligations erga omnes 
partes’ is unnecessary. Secondly, such obligations, as defined, by 
the Court, remain merely ‘erga partes’, binding on the parties to the 
treaty constituting their source qua parties to the treaty and subject, 
as any other conventional obligation, to the rule res inter alios acta 
and to the rules on reservations, which may prevent an ‘obligation 
erga omnes partes’ from becoming binding on states that have made 
a reservation to the provision setting out the terms of the obligation 
and on those accepting such reservations. In this connection, it is 
demonstrated that ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ are only of sig-
nificance if they are ‘obligations erga omnes’ proper, primarily in 
the form of customary obligations under general rules customary 
international law, binding on the parties to the treaty qua custom 
and regardless of any reservation, in addition to being binding on 
non-parties to the respective treaty to which the customary rule is 
opposable. Thirdly, the legal consequences of the use of the concept 
give further indication of the redundancy of the concept.
RESUMEN: La Corte Internacional de Justicia, en su sentencia de 
2010 en el caso Cuestiones Relativas a la Obligación de Procesar 
o Extraditar (Bélgica v. Senegal), concluyó que bélgica tenía legiti-
mación procesal para pretender la responsabilidad de Senegal por 
la presunta violación de sus obligaciones conforme a los Artículos 
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6(2) y 7(1) de la Convención contra la Tortura y que tales preten-
siones eran admisibles. Igualmente, concluyó que no era necesario 
que bélgica fuera ‘especialmente afectada’ o ‘lesionada’. La Corte 
basó sus conclusiones en el concepto de ‘obligaciones erga omnes 
partes’, que definió como obligaciones en el cumplimiento de las 
cuales los estados tienen un ‘interés’, que, en el caso de las citadas 
disposiciones, es un ‘interés común’. varios miembros de la Corte 
rechazaron las citadas conclusiones dada su inconsistencia con el 
derecho de la responsabilidad internacional y la práctica estatal y, 
por otras razones, infundadas. El presente artículo evalúa la defini-
ción de la Corte y su uso del concepto de ‘obligaciones erga omnes 
partes’ a la luz del derecho internacional público. Igualmente, ana-
liza las opiniones manifestadas por otros jueces que participaron en 
la decisión del caso. Tres son los principales argumentos del pre-
sente artículo. En primer lugar, la caracterización de obligaciones 
en el cumplimiento de las cuales todos los estados partes tienen 
un interés –presuntamente uno ‘común’– como ‘obligaciones erga 
omnes partes’ es innecesaria. En segundo lugar, tales obligaciones, 
conforme a la definición de la Corte, son meramente ‘erga partes’, 
obligatorias para las partes del tratado que constituye su fuente en 
tanto partes al tratado y conforme, como es el caso de cualquier 
obligación convencional, con la regla res inter alios acta y las reglas 
sobre reservas, que pueden impedir que una obligación ‘erga omnes 
partes’ devenga vinculante respecto de Estados que han hecho una 
reserva en relación con la disposición que establece los términos de 
la obligación al igual que respecto de los que aceptan la reserva. En 
este sentido, se demuestra que las ‘obligaciones erga omnes partes’ 
sólo tienen importancia si son ‘obligaciones erga omnes’ en sentido 
estricto, particularmente obligaciones consuetudinarias conforme a 
reglas generales consuetudinarias de derecho internacional, obliga-
torias para las partes del tratado en tanto costumbre y sin perjuicio 
de cualquier reserva, además de ser vinculantes respecto de terce-
ros Estados, a los cuales les es oponible la regla consuetudinaria. 
finalmente, las consecuencias del uso del concepto proveen más 
indicios de la redundancia del mismo.
INTRodUCTIoN
This paper studies the nature of so-called ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ 
in public international law, with a particular focus on issues arising out of or 
in connection with claims brought before international courts on the basis 
180
Mejía-LeMos, Diego gerMán (2014): on ‘obLigations erga oMnes partes’ in pubLic 
internationaL Law: ‘erga oMnes’ or ‘erga partes’?
of alleged breaches of such obligations. In this connection, it comments on 
the propositions made in this regard by the International Court of Justice in 
its Judgment of 20 July 2012 in the Questions relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) case as well as on the stances 
taken by several judges sitting on the bench for this case, as set out in their 
declarations and separate or dissenting opinions.
In the above judgment, the Court found, in essence, that: (a) a party to 
a treaty creating obligations in the compliance of which all the parties to the 
treaty have a ‘common interest’, which are characterised as ‘obligations erga 
omnes partes’, has standing for the purposes of bringing claims arising out of 
the breach of such obligations, including, most prominently, an entitlement to 
invoke international responsibility; and (b) such claims are admissible, even 
in the absence of a special interest on the part of the party bringing the claim, 
which the Court needs not determine.
The main contentions of the present paper may be summarised as follows:
first, it is not necessary to characterise obligations in the performance of 
which all the parties to a treaty allegedly have a ‘common interest’ as ‘obli-
gations erga omnes partes’. The main reason for this proposition is that con-
ventional obligations, in principle, are not ‘obligations erga omnes’ proper.
On the one hand, ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ are merely ‘obligations 
erga partes’, binding on the parties to the treaty constituting their source qua 
parties to the treaty and subject, as any other conventional obligation, to the 
rule res inter alios acta and to the rules on reservations, which may prevent 
an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ from becoming binding on states that have 
made a reservation to the provision setting out the terms of the obligation and 
on those accepting such reservations.
On the other hand, so-called ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ are only 
of significance if they are ‘obligations erga omnes’ proper, primarily in the 
form of customary obligations, if the source of such customary obligations is 
a general custom, binding on the parties to the treaty qua custom, indepen-
dently of the treaty and the reservations they may have made, as well as on 
non-parties to the treaty to which the customary rule is opposable. In this lat-
ter sense, ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ are ‘erga omnes’ regardless of their 
binding effect ‘erga partes’.
Secondly, the characterisation of an obligation as ‘obligation erga omnes 
partes’ is not necessary for the purposes of determining (a) whether a party 
to a treaty bringing a claim on the basis of the breach of such obligations has 
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ius standi and (b) whether such claims are admissible. The legal basis for ius 
standi and admissibility of claims is the existence of a legal interest under the 
treaty.
Thirdly, and in addition to the fact that such characterisation is not neces-
sary for the above purposes, the legal consequences of such characterisation 
provide further evidence of the redundancy of the concept.
The present paper is divided into four parts. The present part, Part I, pro-
vides an introduction. Part II primarily analyses the propositions made by the 
Court, particularly those setting out the concept of ‘obligations erga omnes 
partes’ and the legal consequences of this characterisation as to the claimant’s 
ius standi and the admissibility of the respective claims. Part III assesses the 
Court’s propositions in relation to these matters. Part Iv concludes.
The scope of the present analysis and assessment of the Court’s position, 
particularly in Parts II and III, excludes, in principle, the Court’s considerations 
in relation to the merits of the dispute or other issues in connection with the 
Court’s findings as to jurisdiction and admissibility in the specific case. The 
above analysis is confined to considering the Court’s use and definition of 
the concept of ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ and references to other pro-
positions or arguments is made only tangentially, if at all. Also, the present 
analysis is not fully reviewing the vast literature in which the notion has been 
used, as this task cannot be appropriately carried out here, given the paucity 
of space, and given that the present paper is concerned mainly with the use 
of the Court of the above concept, not that made by commentators in other 
instances and in relation to other areas.1
II. ‘oBlIgATIoNS ergA omnes pArtes’ ANd ThE Questions relA-
ting to the obligAtion to prosecute or extrAdite (belgium v. 
senegAl) CASE
This part of the paper summarises the Court’s propositions made in con-
nection with ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ as well as the positions of several 
1 The views of some commentators, and, in particular, the use of the concept in the ILC 
Commentaries to the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful 
Acts are briefly reviewed in the section on the nature of ‘obligations erga omnes parte’ as 
defined by the Court in the case at hand.
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judges sitting on the bench for the above case, as set forth in their dissenting 
or separate opinions.
1.  the court’s propositions as to the concept and legal consequences of 
‘obligations erga omnes partes’ in its Judgment of 20 July 2012
In its 2012 Judgment in the Questions relating to the Obligation to 
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) case, the Court unanimously 
found that it had “jurisdiction to entertain concerning the interpretation and 
application of Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the United 
Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984”.2
The Court considered the question of whether the position of party to 
the Convention is a sufficient condition for the existence of ius standi to bring 
claims “concerning the cessation of alleged violations by another State party 
of its obligations under that instrument”.3
Thus, the Court found that “standing to invoke the responsibility of 
Senegal for the alleged breaches of its obligations under Article 6, paragraph 
2, and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention in the present proceedings”.4
hence, the Court found that “the claims of Belgium based on these 
provisions are admissible”.5 furthermore, the Court found that “there is no 
need for the Court to pronounce on whether Belgium also has a special inter-
est with respect to Senegal’s compliance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention”.6
In this connection, the Court made the following propositions: a) The 
parties to the Convention have a ‘common interest to ensure, in view of they 
shared values’ the prevention of acts torture and the prosecution of respon-
sible of such acts7; b) That common interest implies that the obligations in 
2 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) 
(2012) para. 122(1).
3 Ídem., para. 67.
4 Ídem., para. 70.
5 Ibídem.
6 Ibídem.
7 Ídem., para. 68.
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question are owed by any State party to all the other States parties to the 
Convention8; c) That common interest’ is a “… legal interest” in the protec-
tion of the rights involved”9 In support of this proposition, the Court cites its 
Judgment in the Barcelona Traction case10; d) These obligations may be defi-
ned as “obligations erga omnes partes” in the sense that each State party has 
an interest in compliance with them in any given case.11 This proposition is 
illustrated by the Court by a reference to the obligations under the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of genocide.
In this connection, the Court further pointed out, through a citation of its 
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, that the parties to the above category 
of treaty have a ‘common interest’, namely, an interest which is not ‘of their 
own’, but an interest in “the accomplishment of those high purposes which 
are the raison d’être of the Convention”.12
(a) The parties’ ‘common interest’ “implies the entitlement of each State 
party to the Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an 
alleged breach by another State party”.13 In this connection, the Court puts 
forward that, were the parties required to have a ‘special interest’, “in many 
cases no State would be in the position to make such a claim.”14 Thence the 
Court’s finding to the effect that it need not establish the existence of a ‘special 
interest’ on the part of the claimant.
8 Ibídem.
9 Ibídem.
10 Ibídem, stating: “All the States parties “have a legal interest” in the protection of the rights 
involved (Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
1970, p. 32, para. 33)”.
11 Ibídem.
12 Ibídem, citing ICJ, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, Reports 1951, p. 23.
13 Ibídem, stating: “The common interest in compliance with the relevant obligations 
under the Convention against Torture implies the entitlement of each State party to the 
Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another 
State party”.
14 Ídem., para. 69, stating: “If a special interest were required for that purpose, in many cases 
no State would be in the position to make such a claim”.
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(b) The parties to the Convention, thus, “may invoke the responsibility of 
another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply 
with its obligations erga omnes partes … and to bring that failure to an end”.15
2. the position of several judges sitting on the bench for the case in relation to 
the concept and legal consequences of ‘obligations erga omnes partes
This section analyses the stances taken by judges sitting on the bench for 
the case in relation to the main question analysed in this paper, as set out in 
their respective dissenting and separate opinions and declarations.
A) DeclArAtion of JuDge owADA
Judge Owada, in his declaration attached to the Court’s judgment, cla-
rifies that his vote in favour of the finding in Subparagraph (3), Operative 
Paragraph 122, of the Court’s judgment was made on the basis that, in his 
view, “Belgium’s entitlement to this standing derives from its status as a State 
party to the Convention, and nothing else”.16 Three aspects of his considera-
tions are of relevance to the present paper.
first, in his opinion, there is a “divergence of views on the methodology” 
as to “how the Court should appreciate the nature of the present dispute and 
define its subject-matter”, which has a particular impact on the manner in 
which it addressed issues of jurisdiction and admissibility.17
In particular, as to admissibility, in his view, there was a ‘difference of 
views’ between the parties to the case as to the claimant’s standing to being 
the claim, which consisted of two elements, namely the status of belgium as a 
party to the Convention and its special interest, which would give it ius standi 
in the present case.18
15 Ibídem, stating: “It follows that any State party to the Convention may invoke the 
responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to 
comply with its obligations erga omnes partes, such as those under Article 6, paragraph 2, 
and Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and to bring that failure to an end”.
16 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 
Declaration of Judge Owada, para. 15.
17 Ídem., para. 1.
18 Ídem., para. 16, directly quoting para. 66 of the Judgment.
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The Court, in his view, did not address this element of the difference of 
views between the parties, which “admittedly relates to an issue that belongs 
to the merits of the case”, and which, in his view, was “a more contentious 
claim”19. as it focused only on one of the elements of the difference, namely, 
the status of belgium as a party to the Convention.20
Secondly, the Court’s approach, in his opinion, “will inevitably have its 
legal consequences upon the scope of the subject-matter of the dispute that is 
admissible before the Court and upon the nature and the scope of the claims 
on which Belgium can seise the Court in this dispute”.21 Particularly, it would 
entail that belgium “is in a legal position neither to claim the extradition of Mr. 
Habré … nor to demand an immediate notification” pursuant to Articles 5(2) 
and 6(4) of the Convention, respectively, but merely to “insist on compliance”, 
“like any other State party to the same Convention”.22
Lastly, Judge Owada does not seem to fully agree on the Court’s pro-
position that the Convention creates obligations erga omnes partes, as he 
considers that the Convention would only ‘allegedly’ do so.23 On this point, 
which he considers to be an “arguably controversial basis for entitlement of a 
State party to the Convention”, he apparently concurs with Judge Skotnikov’s 
views, indicating that the issue as to its plausibility is not directly addressed 
in his considerations.24
B) SepArAte opinion of JuDge Skotnikov
Judge Skotnikov considered that the Court “erred as to the grounds on 
which” it made its finding of admissibility of belgium’s claims pursuant to 
Articles 6(2) and 7(1) of the Convention.25 Indeed, he concludes, for the rea-
sons commented on below in further detail, that the Court’s finding does not 
“seem to be founded in law, be it conventional or customary”.26 In particular, 
he put forward the following propositions.
19 Ídem., para. 18.
20 Ídem., para. 17.
21 Ídem., para. 21.
22 Ídem., para. 22.
23 Ídem., para. 19.
24 Ídem., para. 21.
25 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 
Declaration of Judge Skotnikov, para. 1.
26 Ídem., para. 22.
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first, “Belgium did not seise this Court simply as a State party to the 
Convention”.27 Accordingly, the Court, in his view, failed to fulfil its “duty 
under its Statute to settle disputes”, “by reducing” Belgium’s “status in the 
present proceedings to that of any State party to the Convention”.28
Secondly, the Court’s finding that belgium has ius standi to invoke 
Senegal’s responsibility for the alleged breach of the obligations set out in 
Articles 6(2) and 7(1) of the Convention is, in his view, a finding which “is not 
properly explained, nor is it justified”.29
In this connection, he enquires whether the parties’ ‘common interest’ 
amounts to “a right of any State party to invoke the responsibility of any other 
State party before this Court, under the Convention against Torture, for an 
alleged breach of obligations erga omnes partes”.30
The implication of such a right in the parties’ ‘common interest’ was not 
explained by the Court, in his view.31
Also, he posits that the Court’s finding is not sufficiently demonstrated, as 
it is not based on interpretation of the Convention, but merely relies only on a 
citation of the Convention’s Preamble and the characterization of it “as being 
similar to the Genocide Convention”.32
In particular, he considers that the Court’s equation of a ‘common 
interest’ to the above ‘procedural right’ would require, in order to be proved, 
to address the following issues, which the Court failed to address: (a) The 
question of “how such treaties could simultaneously envisage the right of 
a State party to make reservations to its jurisdiction”33; (b) The existence of 
27 Ídem., para. 5.
28 Ídem., para. 9.
29 Ídem., para. 10.
30 Ídem., para. 12.
31 Ídem., para. 18, stating: “By contrast, in the view of the Court, an entitlement of each 
State party to the Convention against Torture to make a claim concerning the existence of 
an alleged breach by another State party is implied in the common interest of the States 
parties’ compliance with the relevant obligations under the Convention against Torture 
(see Judgment, paragraph 69). No explanation is offered in support of this statement”.
32 Ídem., para. 13.
33 Ídem., para. 14.
187
ARS BONI ET AEQUI (AÑO 10 N° 1): PP. 177-214
“opt-out or opt-in clauses”34 in relation to the Court’s jurisdiction and the 
Committee against Torture’s competence, which remains optional35; (c) The 
inexistence of an express grant of a right to invoke responsibility, as illustrated 
by the European Convention on human Rights, which expressly provides for 
such a right in Article 33 and “[i]nterestingly, and most logically” does not 
allow for reservations to the European Court of human Rights’ jurisdiction.36
In this connection, he further stated that the Court had failed: (1) To de-
monstrate “in respect of the same –and rather important– entitlement”, how 
the inexistence of an express provision can lead to the same results as those 
under a treaty which includes such a provision37 and whether the inclusion or 
exclusion by the drafters of such a provision is of no consequence38; (2) To take 
into account the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, “which do not support the 
Court’s position”, particularly in light of the commentaries to Article 48 thereof, 
according to which the entitlement to invoke responsibility granted to ‘any state 
party’ to a treaty is only predicated of treaties expressly allowing for it, “without 
in any way implying that such an entitlement is allowed in treaties which do not 
contain a specific provision to that effect”. Indeed, the ILC’s commentaries, in 
his opinion, are not ambiguous, as it expressly pointed out that states ought to 
have a specific ‘right of action conferred by a treaty’ or be ‘considered an inju-
red state’ in order to be able to invoke responsibility39; (3) To cite any relevant 
precedent or mention facts indicating the inexistence of state practice providing 
authority for the Court’s ´propositions.40
34 Ídem., para. 16, stating: “If the logic adopted by the Court were correct, no such opt-out 
or opt-in clauses would have been allowed in the Convention. The simple truth is that the 
Convention does not go as far as the Court suggests”.
35 Ídem., para. 15, stating: “Furthermore, under the Convention against Torture, any State 
party has the right to shield itself not only from accountability before the Court but also 
from the scrutiny of the Committee against Torture. This scrutiny is based on the erga 
omnes partes principle but, tellingly, remains optional”.
36 Ídem., para. 17.
37 Ídem., para. 19, stating: “Accordingly, it does not offer its view as to how that which is 
expressly provided for in one treaty could simply be implied in another, in respect of the 
same –and rather important– entitlement”.
38 Ídem., further stating: “If one accepts the logic of the Judgment, it would make no 
difference whether such an express provision were included in or excluded from a treaty 
by its drafters. This cannot be right”.
39 Ídem., para. 21 (emphasis added not reproduced).
40 Ídem., para. 20.
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c) SepArAte opinion of JuDge cAnçADo trinDADe
Judge Cançado Trindade expresses the view that obligations erga om-
nes partes “ensue” from “the absolute prohibition of torture, belonging to the 
domain of jus cogens”, set out in the Convention.41 This, in his view, is ack-
nowledged by the parties to the dispute.42
furthermore, he characterizes the obligations under the Convention as 
obligations of result, as opposed to “simple obligations of means or conduct”, 
given that “we are here in the domain of peremptory norms of internatio-
nal law, of jus cogens, generating obligations erga omnes partes under the 
Convention against Torture”.43
Lastly, it is interesting to point out that Judge Cançado Trindade has used 
the concept ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ to refer to obligations which he 
had characterised as being ‘erga omnes’ in separate opinions in his previous 
capacity as Judge of the Inter-American Court of human Rights.44
D) DiSSenting opinion of JuDge Xue
Judge xue expresses her disagreement with the Court’s findings “on a 
number of important issues”.45
In her opinion, the Court, by basing “its reasoning on the notion obliga-
tions erga omnes partes”, failed to address the question46 of “whether Senegal 
owes an obligation to Belgium to extradite”.47
The existence of this obligation, in her view, “first and foremost, depends 
on whether Belgium has entitlement to exercise jurisdiction in accordance 
41 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) 
(2012), Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, paras. 104 and 175.
42 Ídem., para. 104.
43 Ídem., para. 175.
44 See, for instance, Inter-American Court of human Rights, Mapiripán Massacre vs. 
Colombia (2005, Serie C n° 134), Separate Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, 
para. 17.
45 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) 
(2012), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Xue, para. 1.
46 Ídem., para. 12.
47 Ídem., para. 11.
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with Article 5 of the Convention”, which the Court should have had interpre-
ted in order to properly address “this crucial issue presented by Senegal in the 
judgment”.48
She pointed out that the Court’s findings, based on this ‘notion’, that 
belgium has standing to invoke Senegal’s responsibility and that the former’s 
claims are admissible, are “abrupt and unpersuasive”.49 In this connection, 
she further affirms that this “entitlement to monitor the implementation of any 
State party on the basis of [sic] erga omnes partes, certainly goes beyond the 
legal framework of the Convention”.50
first, the ‘notion’ of ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, which is based on 
what she characterises as an obiter dictum taken from the Court’s judgment in 
the Barcelona Traction case51, “goes far beyond treaty interpretation, deviating 
from the established jurisprudence of the Court”.52
In relation to the Court’s use of the above dictum, she expresses the view 
that the Court ‘misused’ it “in several aspects”, as in the above dictum, na-
mely: (a) The Court only drew “the distinction between obligations owed to 
the international community as a whole and those arising vis-à-vis another 
State”; (b) the Court did not address “the question of standing in respect of 
obligations erga omnes”, having confined itself to set out “the conditions for 
the breach of obligations in bilateral relations”; (c) The Court only conside-
red “substantive law rather than procedural rules”; (d) The Court gave “no 
indication to change the state of the law in the sense that there is no general 
standing resident with each and every State to bring a case in the Court for the 
vindication of a communal interest”.53
As for other instances of references by the Court to ‘obligations erga 
omnes’, Judge xue considers that in none of them has the Court “pronounced 
that the existence of a common interest alone would give a State entitlement 
to bring a claim in the Court”.54
48 Ídem., para. 12.
49 Ídem., para. 14.
50 Ídem., para. 39.
51 Ídem., para. 13.
52 Ídem., para. 12.
53 Ídem., para. 15.
54 Ídem., para. 16.
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Secondly, the Court’s finding as to obligations erga omnes partes is in-
consistent, particularly in light of the law of state responsibility, for the fo-
llowing reasons:55 (a) The obligations to prosecute or extradite set out in the 
Convention “are treaty rules, subject to the terms of the Convention”, without 
prejudice to the fact that the prohibition of torture “has become part of jus 
cogens in international law”56 ; (b) The parties’ ‘common interest’ in the “ob-
servance, by virtue of treaty law, of the above rules is without prejudice to 
“the mere fact that a State is a party to the Convention”, as, “[u]nder inter-
national law”, “an interest in the compliance with” an obligation is different 
from the “standing to bring a claim against another State for the breach of 
such obligations in the Court”57; (c) The law of state responsibility, as set out 
in Article 42, ILC Articles on State Responsibility, sets out a “procedural rule”, 
which requires a state to “show what obligations that another State party 
owes to it under the Convention have been breached. Such “injury”, to use 
the language in Article 42 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on 
State Responsibility, distinguishes the State from other State parties as it is 
“specially affected” by the breach”58; (d) The applicability of the above “pro-
cedural rule” is not prevented by the ius cogens character of the prohibition of 
torture59; (e) The adoption of the “the notion erga omnes partes … has blurred 
the distinction between the claimant State and the other State parties by pres-
cribing a general right to invoke international responsibility in the Court”60; (f) 
The Court’s finding has “no support of State practice in the application of the 
Convention”.61
Thirdly, the Court’s finding as to admissibility, particularly its proposition 
that, were a special interest required, state parties would not be in a position 
to make claims “concerning the cessation of an alleged breach by another 
State” is unfounded62 and inconsistent with the law of treaties63, for the fo-
55 Ídem., paras. 17 and 18.
56 Ídem., para. 17.
57 Ibídem.
58 Ibídem.
59 Ibídem.
60 Ídem., para. 18.
61 Ídem., further stating: “As a matter of fact, the dispute between the Parties arose over the 
interpretation and application of the principle aut dedere aut judicare under Article 7, 
paragraph 1. In other words, Belgium’s Application rests on the terms of the Convention 
rather than the existence of a common interest”.
62 Ídem., para. 19.
63 Ídem., para. 23, stating: “In accordance with treaty law, any interpretation and application 
of the object and purpose of the Convention should not contradict, or even override the 
191
ARS BONI ET AEQUI (AÑO 10 N° 1): PP. 177-214
llowing reasons: (a) The Convention created a “reporting and monitoring sys-
tem”, under Articles 17 to 20, and a “communication mechanism”, pursuant 
to Article 21, which “are designed exactly to serve the common interest of the 
State parties in the compliance with the obligations under the Convention”64; 
(b) The existence, and conditions for the operation, of the above conventional 
mechanis65, particularly those of the communications mechanisms66, and the 
fact that states parties may make reservations pursuant to the Article 30(2) of 
the Convention, regarding, i.a., the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 30(1), 
idem,67 indicate that “the State parties in no way intended to create obliga-
tions erga omnes partes” in Articles 6(2) and 7(1). Indeed, in her opinion, 
“[o]bviously, if the State parties had intended to create obligations erga om-
nes partes, as pronounced by the Court, Articles 21 and Article 30, paragra-
ph 1, should have been made mandatory rather than optional for the State 
parties”.68
e) DeclArAtion of JuDge Donoghue
In her Declaration, Judge Donoghue expresses her agreement with the 
Court’s decision and exposes in further detail her views as to “the meaning of” 
Articles 6(2) and 7(1) of the Convention.69
She points out that “[t]he question of whether Senegal complied with” 
its obligations under Articles 6(2) and 7(1) “is at the heart of this case”70 and 
that she agrees with the the findings of the Court for the following reasons: 
(a) Articles 4 and 5 “unquestionably impose a duty on States parties to put in 
place legislation”71; (b) The “adherence” of the obligations set out in Articles 4 
and 5 “is of consequence to all other State parties, so it is difficult to see why 
the duty would be owed to some State parties but not to others”72; (c) Article 6 
sets forth an obligation to “to place the individual in custody and immediately 
clear terms of the treaty”.
64 Ídem., para. 19.
65 Ídem., para. 20.
66 Ídem., para. 21.
67 Ídem., para. 22.
68 Ídem., para. 23.
69 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 
Declaration of Judge Donoghue, para. 1.
70 Ídem., para. 2.
71 Ídem., para. 10.
72 Ibídem.
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to make a preliminary inquiry, whenever an individual allegedly responsible 
for torture is present in its territory, without limitation as to the location of the 
alleged offence or the nationality of the victim or alleged offender”73; (d) The 
“breach of these obligation” under Article 6 “[o]nce again, is of consequence 
to all States parties”74 ; (e) Article 7(1) does not set out an obligation to extra-
dite, but only “to submit a case for prosecution”75; (f) The obligations under 
Articles 6(2) and 7(1) arise in the event that an alleged offender is present in 
a state party’s territory,76 independently of an extradition request77; (g) Article 
7(1), which “requires submission for prosecution “in cases contemplated in 
Article 5”, “might be seen to suggest that the duty to submit a case for prose-
cution is owed only to States that fit within Article 5: the State in the territory 
of which the offence allegedly occurred; the State of the offender’s nationali-
ty; and the State of the victim’s nationality (if that State exercises jurisdiction 
based on a victim’s nationality)”78; (h) The interpretation of Article 7(1) in the 
sense that its confined to the three cases contemplated in Article 5, as noted 
above, is a “more parsimonious approach would greatly reduce the potency 
of the related obligations in Articles 4 to 7 of the Convention”, as this would 
imply that “the alleged offender will enjoy precisely the sort of safe haven that 
the Convention was intended to eliminate”.79
The consequence of the ‘parsimonious approach’ would arise in the 
two following situations which are, in her view, “hypothetical, but … not 
far-fetched”:80 (1) On the one hand, if “the State where the alleged offender 
is located owes no duty to any other State in a situation in which the alleged 
torture occurs in its territory and the victim and alleged offender are nationals 
of that State” “[t]he territorial State would be free to accord impunity to the 
alleged offender”; (2) On the other hand, “[t]he problem would persist if the 
alleged offender fled to the territory of another State. The State in the territory 
of which the alleged offence occurred (which, in this example, is also the 
State of nationality of the alleged offender and of the victim) might decide not 
to invoke the responsibility of the State in the territory of which the alleged 
offender is located”.
73 Ibídem.
74 Ibídem.,
75 Ídem., paras. 3 and 4.
76 Ídem., paras. 8 and 9.
77 Ídem., paras. 6 and 8, in relation to Article 7(1) and the two provisions in question, 
respectively.
78 Ídem., para. 11.
79 Ibídem.
80 Ibídem.
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hence, the obligations set out in Articles 6(2) and 7(1) are “owed to all 
States parties”, as was the case in relation to Mr habré’s case. In her opinion, 
for the reasons summarised above, “[h]ere, it is again important to bear in 
mind the combined package of obligations comprising Articles 4 to 7 of the 
Convention”.81
Therefore, in light of the above, “[f]or each of these provisions, therefore, 
it can be said that the State in the territory of which the offender is found has 
duties that correspond to rights on the part of all other States parties”.82
The Court’s finding that the obligations set out in Articles 6(2) and 7(1) 
are erga omnes partes and that, hence, belgium is entitled to invoke responsi-
bility for their alleged breach, in her view, “integrates into a single step its un-
derstanding of the primary rules specified in the Convention; their erga omnes 
character; and the secondary rules of State responsibility (i.e., that Belgium 
may invoke Senegal’s responsibility). In all respects, the Court’s analysis turns 
on substantive law”.83
furthermore, Judge Donoghue clarifies that, in spite of the above, the 
“characterization” of “duties” as “erga omnes partes” “may not fit every pro-
vision of the Convention”.84
Lastly, in her view, the fact that Article 30(2) provides for a “compromis-
sory clause of the Convention permits States to opt out of the jurisdiction of 
this Court” does not “detract from the erga omnes partes character of parti-
cular obligations”. In this connection, Judge Donoghue expresses her view 
that it is unclear “how flexibility as to dispute resolution mechanisms could 
erode the substance of a State’s duties under a treaty”85, which “would apply 
to many human rights treaties that permit flexibility as to dispute resolution 
mechanisms”.86
On the one hand, in her opinion, the Court’s finding would find support 
in the proposition that “the erga omnes character of a norm could not itself 
be the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction”, set out in the 1995 and 2006 jud-
gments on the merits and on jurisdiction and admissibility in the East Timor 
81 Ídem., para. 9.
82 Ídem., para. 10.
83 Ídem., para. 13.
84 Ídem., para. 12.
85 Ídem., para. 17.
86 Ídem., para. 16.
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and Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo cases, respectively.87 On the 
other hand, “[t]he erga omnes partes character of provisions of the Convention 
against Torture defines the duties of all States parties, as a matter of substanti-
ve law”, and “[a]ll States parties have an obligation to implement those duties 
in good faith, regardless of the dispute resolution mechanisms associated with 
the particular treaty”. The two abovementioned matters “are, once again, ‘two 
different things’”.88
F) Dissenting opinion oF juDge AD hoc sur
Judge ad hoc Sur expresses the view that the reference to ius cogens 
“is entirely superfluous and does not contribute to the settlement of the 
dispute”.89 In his view, the admissibility of belgium’s claim “is at the heart of 
the dispute”90 and “by contrast” to prior instances of references to erga omnes 
obligations, “the erga omnes partes effect is crucial to admissibility, and thus 
must be considered carefully”.91 In his opinion, the obligation of Senegal “to 
seise the competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution … is not owed 
to Belgium”, and the latter’s claim is inadmissible.92
In particular, he puts forward the following propositions: (a) The Court 
substituted “the Parties’ apparently convergent positions with its own inter-
pretation of the Convention” as to, i.a., the erga omnes partes character of 
obligations thereunder93; (b) The interpretation of the Convention by the Court 
fails to demonstrate “that the Convention establishes an erga omnes partes 
obligation to submit the case to the competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution”94, which the Court merely “asserts”, given “the weakness, if not 
lack, of legal bases in the Convention itself”, of the Court’s proposition”.95
In particular, he points out that the Court did not interpret the treaty 
in accordance with the vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as it “it 
87 Ídem., para. 17.
88 Ibídem.
89 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) 
(2012), Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Sur, para. 4.
90 Ídem., para. 5.
91 Ídem., para. 29.
92 Ídem., para. 44.
93 Ídem., para. 12.
94 Ídem., para. 13.
95 Ídem., para. 25.
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has adopted a teleological interpretation, constructing, on the basis of a 
purpose which is said by it to govern all of the provisions, an obligation 
erga omnes partes which is not substantiated by the text or the intention 
of the parties, and even less so by their practice. Furthermore, the Court 
does not even attempt to consider the above directives, confining itself to 
unfounded assertions of principle”.96
he characterizes the parties’ obligation “to submit the case to their com-
petent authorities for the purpose of prosecution” as a procedural one and 
submits that the Court’s proposition is based on “three general and undifferen-
tiated principles or presuppositions, none of which is truly demonstrated, and 
which even appear to be contradicted by an examination of the Convention”.97 
These three presumptions are as follows:
(1) “First, there are certain treaties establishing obligations erga omnes 
partes”.98 In connection with this first presumption, he considers that the two 
obiter dicta99 invoked by the Court are irrelevant, for the following reasons:
(i) The dictum in the 1970 Judgment in the Barcelona Traction case is 
irrelevant, for “it pertains to obligations of conventional, not customary origin 
and because, moreover, the Court has ruled that it does not have jurisdiction 
to take cognizance of customary rules in the context of the present dispute”.
(ii) The dictum in the 1951 Advisory Opinion on Genocide, while con-
cerning “concerned a treaty … and therefore obligations erga omnes partes”, 
is irrelevant, as “the rules in question were customary ones that were obliga-
tory irrespective of participation in the Convention”, the character as erga om-
nes partes of obligations subject to reservations being disregarded as a result 
of the paradoxical invocation of “some form of international public order so 
as to justify making reservations to it”.
96 Ídem., para. 35, further stating: “The object and purpose of the Convention, as determined 
by the Court, have superseded and removed all other considerations. In this respect, the 
Court seems anxious to appear up to date, in touch with certain courts, notably the inter-
national criminal courts, and not outmoded by comparison. However, what is involved 
here is interpreting a convention, not conducting a trial”.
97 Ídem., para. 26.
98 Ídem., para. 27.
99 Ídem., para. 29, stating: “These two cases involved either an obiter dictum or a finding 
that was not essential to the settlement of the dispute or the response to the question”.
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(2) “Second, the Convention against Torture is one of these, because it 
falls into a particular category of treaties, a category which, incidentally, is 
overlooked by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties codifying custo-
mary law on the subject”.100
(3) “Third, all of the obligations contained in the Convention fall into this 
category, in particular the obligation to submit the case to the competent 
authorities for the institution of criminal proceedings”.
with respect to this third presumption, he further states that, if the first 
assertion is “true in positive law, it would in no way imply that the Convention 
against Torture, particularly the Convention in its entirety, meets the condi-
tions that are laid down”.101
Indeed, although the Court found that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on 
“whether the rule invoked by Belgium was customary as well as conventio-
nal”, he affirms that “obligations should be distinguished from their normative, 
conventional or customary framework”.
Also, he considers that the obligations set out in a treaty may differ in 
nature “and the erga omnes partes character of a treaty as a whole cannot be 
presumed or inferred from the presence of an erga omnes partes obligation 
therein”.
In this latter regard, he further posits that “regarding the Convention as a 
unit … has no legal basis”, particularly taking into account that some provi-
sions are subject to reservation, including the definition of torture, and some 
may or may not be declarative of customary law102, and that “[t]he legal issue 
is thus the interpretation of the Convention against Torture and not its inclu-
sion by declaration of the Court in a specific category of treaties said to create 
erga omnes partes obligations by their nature”.
100 Ídem., para. 27.
101 Ibídem.
102 Ídem., para. 30, stating, in this regard: “In my view, regarding the Convention as a unit 
–even though reservations may be made to it, including in respect of the very definition 
of torture, even though some requirements are optional and others discretionary, and 
even though certain stipulations reflect customary rules while others do not– has no legal 
basis”.
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The Court fails to “justify in any way” that an obligation erga omnes par-
tes is “another basis of admissibility”, the foundation of which is, in his view, 
“is doubtful to say the least”.103
The Court’s proposition that obligations under the Convention have an 
erga omnes partes character may be attaining a different goal, namely that of 
establishing “the admissibility of a questionable Belgian Application” and of 
giving, ultimately, “give the Convention against Torture the status of an erga 
omnes norm”, “a sort of sacralization of the Convention”.104
The “existence of an obligation erga omnes partes … was invoked only 
belatedly”.105
The proposition that “a complaint by an individual which has not resulted 
in proceedings being brought is necessary for an inter-State dispute to exist 
and for implementation of the Convention” would amount to “privatizing” an 
erga omnes partes obligation which, if it exists, must be borne directly and 
exclusively by the States parties.106 In this connection, he further states that 
“erga omnes partes jurisdiction takes effect immediately and is not dependent 
on individual complaints”.107
In addition, he considers that the Court’s implicit reliance on the ILC 
Articles on Responsibility is not justified, as, in his view, it is unclear that they 
reflect customary law and, in particular, “the articles relating to “States other 
than injured States” fell within the realm of progressive development, i.e., that 
they were not part of customary law as lex lata”.108
To conclude, he posits that, while “[t]he universal prohibition of torture is 
thus a customary rule”, which he prefers to characterize as setting out an “an 
103 Ídem., para. 20.
104 Ídem., para. 13.
105 Ídem., para. 20; see also para. 23, in which Judge ad hoc Sur expresses his views that 
belgium “should have made that request as soon as it became a party to the Convention, 
in 1999” or “since Belgium considers that the alleged breach dates back to 2000, that is to 
say, to the point when complaints against Hissène Habré failed in Senegal, it should have 
raised the matter then”.
106 Ídem., para. 24.
107 Ibídem.
108 Ídem., para. 31.
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intransgressible obligation” rather than ius cogens109, “the same is not true of 
the obligation to prosecute” as the former “does not automatically apply; nor 
does it extend in either law or fact to all other obligations in the Convention”.
III. ‘oBlIgATIoNS ergA omnes pArtes’ ANd pUBlIC INTERNATIoNAl 
lAw
This part of the paper sets out propositions in relation to the concept of 
‘obligations erga omnes partes’ and the legal consequences of its use. The 
propositions made in this part intend to analyse the concept and the legal 
consequences it may have in light of a number of branches of public inter-
national law. Also, this part seeks to analyse the cogency of the propositions 
set forth by the Court in relation to the concept of ‘obligations erga omnes 
partes’. It is divided into three sections, concerning, respectively, the nature 
and concept as well as the source of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ and the 
legal consequences of the characterisation of an obligation as such.
1. the nature and concept of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’
This section analyses the Court’s ‘definition’ of ‘obligations erga omnes 
partes’ and demonstrates the following propositions:
first, in light of the definition of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ set out 
in the Court’s judgment, the only property of such obligations is the existence 
of ‘an interest’, which need not even be ‘common’, in the performance of the 
obligation. There would be, therefore, ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ in the 
performance of which there are individual interests or a ‘common interest’. 
In this connection, the characterisation of the former type of obligation as an 
‘obligation erga omnes partes’ would be a redundancy, as the existence of an 
interest, predicated individually of subjects to which the obligation is owed, 
is a property of any obligation.
109 Ídem., paras. 32 and 33, stating, respectively, that “there is no question that the prohibition 
of torture is also an intransgressible obligation, in the sense of the Court’s Advisory Opinion 
on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (I.C.J. Reports 
1996 (I))” and that “the notion of an ‘intransgressible obligation’ is certainly preferable to 
a reference to jus cogens, since the latter is supposed to render incompatible treaties null 
and void”.
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Secondly, ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ may be of no significance, un-
less they are regarded as ‘obligations erga omnes’. Indeed, ‘obligations erga 
omnes partes’ can only be conventional obligations, ‘erga partes’, or ‘obli-
gations erga omnes’ proper, primarily in the form of customary obligations. 
hence, in the only aspect in which ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ would be 
significant, this characterisation proves to be redundant.
A) the ‘Definition’ of ‘oBligAtionS ergA omneS pArteS’ Set forth By the court
The Court seemed to have expressly sought to set out a ‘definition’ of 
‘obligations erga omnes partes’ in the following sentence, contained in para-
graph 68 of its considerations:
“These obligations may be defined as “obligations erga omnes partes” in 
the sense that each State party has an interest in compliance with them in any 
given case”.110
fist, the Court uses the nominal phrase “[t]hese obligations”. The use of 
this phrase, and, in particular, of the demonstrative adjective ‘these’ is unclear, 
as it may be understood either as delimiting the types of obligation which 
“may be defined” as ‘obligations erga omnes partes’, or as characterising the 
obligations referred to by the nominal phrase, namely those set out in Articles 
6(2) and 7(1) of the Convention, as ‘obligations erga omnes partes’. The latter 
possibility is adopted in the present analysis. In this sense, the above sentence 
serves as ‘definition’ and as ‘characterisation’.
Secondly, the Court uses the verbal phrase “may be defined”. This use 
of the past participle ‘defined’ implies that the Court sought to set out a de-
finition in the same sentence in which it characterised the obligations in the 
terms of the definition in question, as noted above.
Thirdly, the Court sets out the properties ascribed to ‘obligations erga 
omnes partes’ (definiens) in the definition through the use of a clause introdu-
ced through the prepositional phrase introduced by “in the sense …”.
fourthly, the above clause only assigns one property to ‘obligations 
erga omnes partes’, namely that of being an obligation in the performance 
of which “each State party has an interest”. In this sense, the type of interest 
which must exist for an obligation to be an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ 
110 Ídem., para. 68.
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must not necessarily be a ‘common interest’, as predicated of the obligations 
set out in Articles 6(2) and 7(1) of the Convention. Indeed, what is required is 
‘an interest’.
Therefore, there would be two types of ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, 
namely, obligations in the performance of which the interest is not ‘common’, 
and obligations in the performance of which the interest is common. hence, 
the characterisation of an interest as ‘common’ is not necessary, provided that 
the interest in question is ‘an interest’ predicated of each party.
It seems, in this connection, that the Court’s characterisation of the in-
terest in the performance of the obligations set out in Articles 6(2) and 7(1) 
of the Convention as ‘common’ would only be relevant to the extent that the 
obligations of each state party to the Convention pursuant to those provisions 
would, through that qualification, correspond to each (the ‘erga partes’ ele-
ment) and all (the ‘erga omnes’ element, arguably) the states parties to the 
Convention.
furthermore, it must be noted that, interestingly, in all of the statements 
made by judges sitting on the bench for the case in question, both those who 
are in favour of as well as those who oppose to the use of the concept of 
‘obligations erga omnes partes’, it seems to be assumed that the existence of 
a ‘common interest’ is an element of the definition of ‘obligations erga omnes 
partes’. None of them identified the futility of characterising an obligation as 
erga omnes partes if there is an interest of each party in the performance of 
the obligation, as such interest is arguably predicable of every party without 
the need for a concept in addition to that of obligation.
The following sub-section analyses the nature of ‘obligations erga omnes 
partes’ in light on the foregoing commentaries on the Court’s definition and 
elaborates further on some of the implications of the only element which 
constitutes the definiens of the definition of an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, 
namely, ‘an interest’ of ‘each State party’ to the treaty in the performance of 
the obligation.
b) the nature oF ‘obLigations ergA omneS pArteS’ in accorDance with the 
court’s DeFinition anD in Light oF reLevant practice anD Literature
The nature of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’, in accordance with the 
Court’s definition, is that of being (i) a conventional obligation (ii) in the per-
formance of which ‘each State party’ has ‘an interest’.
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first, its nature as a ‘conventional obligation’ is implicit and arises not 
only from the fact that, in the case at hand, it is predicated of obligations un-
der Article 6(2) and 7(1) of the Convention, but also from the fact that the defi-
nition of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’, analysed above, refers to the interest 
in its performance on the part of ‘each State party’. The contradictions raised 
by the conventional nature of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ is analysed in 
further detail below, in relation to the fact that this aspect of their nature flows 
from the fact that their source is a treaty.
Secondly, the only property explicitly predicated of ‘obligations erga om-
nes partes’ is the existence of an interest of each party to the treaty individually 
is predicable of any obligation. The attribution of this property to ‘obligations 
erga omnes partes’ is, as noted above, redundant, as regardless of whether it 
is ‘erga omnes partes’ or not, there may always be ‘an interest’ of ‘each State 
party’ to the treaty in the performance of the obligation, which arises, in parti-
cular, when the obligation is owed to that state party. This aspect is studied in 
further detail below, in the section concerning the legal consequences of the 
characterisation of an obligation as an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’.
The wimbledon case is regarded as having involved an obligation erga 
omnes partes.111 The International Criminal Tribunal (ICTy), in the blaskic 
case, expressly stated that Article 29 of the ICTy Statute “was valid erga om-
nes partes”.112
further instances of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ are, according 
to commentators, certain treaties in the fields of human rights, such as the 
European Convention on human Rights, international humanitarian law, such 
as the 1949 geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols thereto, interna-
tional environmental law, such as the Biodiversity Convention or the Ozone 
Protocol, law of the seas, such as Article 218 in the United Nations Convention 
on Law of the Seas, and trade law, most prominently wTO agreements.113
The nature of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ has also been the object 
of a large number of academic materials in which commentators often com-
ment on the concept and its use in certain areas of public international law, 
particularly in light of the use of the term in Commentary 6 to Article 48(1)
111 United Nations International Law Commission, Third Report on State Responsibility, p. 
53, footnote 206.
112 tams (2010) p. 120.
113 Cfr., Ibídem,
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(a) of the ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful 
Acts (ARSIwA).114
In this connection, there seems to be consensus among commentators 
and certain institutions, such as the ILC, that ‘obligations erga omnes partes’: 
(a) ‘Obligations erga omnes partes’ are a type of “multilateral obligation”;115 
and, therefore, are, primarily, “treaty-based”, as opposed to obligations erga 
omnes, which presumably derive from “general international law”116, of-
ten equated to general customary international law117; (b) ‘Obligations erga 
omnes partes’ derive from ‘specific legal regimes’118 and are owed to “the 
particular community of treaty parties”119, i.e., “all the parties to a particular 
114 United Nations International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report 
of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682 , 13 April 2006, 
para. 393.
115 United Nations International Law Commission, Third Report on State Responsibility, p. 50
116 tams (2010) pp. 121 and 122, noting that “[c]ourts and commentators differentiating 
between obligations erga omnes and obligations erga omnes partes usually assume that 
the former derive from general international law – hence the need to distinguish them from 
treaty-based obligations”. See, Ídem., p. 120, footnote 23, stating: “commentators have 
asserted the existence of treaty-based obligations erga omnes (not: erga omnes partes) 
without clarifying that they would only be owed to the treaty parties”.
117 This seems to be assumed by certain commentators. See, for instance, tams (2010) p. 310, 
restating the view that obligations erga omnes arise under general international law and 
further specifying that “a treaty-based counterpart” would be in the form of “so-called 
‘obligations erga omnes partes’”, the former being assumed, therefore, to be customary.
118 siciLianos (2002) p. 1139.
119 This view is partially accepted by the ILC in its definition of obligation erga omnes partes 
for the purposes of identifying are which should be addressed in order to attain more 
consistency in the field of treaty law, de lege ferenda. United Nations International Law 
Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, p. 251. See, also, tams (2010) p. 122, stating, 
in relation to the use of the dictum in para. 34 of the judgment in the Barcelona Traction 
case, “[c]ommentators interpreting para. 34 as an implicit recognition of obligations erga 
omnes partes do so with the proviso that these obligations would be owed not to the 
international community as a whole but to the particular community of treaty parties. This, 
however, is not what the Court said: it did not mention communities of treaty parties, but 
quite clearly stated that all States (members of the international community) have a legal 
interest in seeing obligations erga omnes observed”.
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regime”120, which have “a common legal interest” “in the maintenance and 
implementation” of the regime establishing the obligation121; such interest 
would be a “public interest of all States parties”122, “of all of them jointly”123; 
(c) ‘Obligations erga omnes partes’, which are regarded to have been taken 
into account in Article 48(1)(a), ILC ARSIwA, are analogous to ‘interdepen-
dent’ or ‘integral’ obligations, which are considered to be recognised in Article 
60(2)(c), vCLT.124 Indded, they are considered to be “collective”, the relation-
ships which they create not being susceptible of separation “into bilateral 
components”125; (d) ‘Obligations erga omnes partes’ give rise to a “legally 
protected interest, for the purposes of State responsibility, in the legal rela-
tions of third States inter se”, alongside ‘integral obligations’126, which would 
be a sub-category of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’127; It must be noted, in 
any case, that injuries arising from the breach of the obligation would not be 
to the exclusion of being injured in other manners and in relation of other 
obligations through the same “breach”128; (e) ‘Obligations erga omnes partes’ 
would have, arguably, a degree of significance and universality arguably les-
ser than obligations erga omnes, even if arising in the same field, as illustrated 
by “human rights obligations”.129
120 United Nations International Law Commission, Third Report on State Responsibility, p. 49.
121 Ídem., p. 49.
122 Ibídem.
123 Inter-American Court of humann Rights, Las Palmeras vs. Colombia, Separate Opinion of 
Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade (2000, Serie Cn° 67), para. 12, further stating that such an 
obligation would also be “of direct interest of each State party”.
124 peLLet A., (2002), p. 10
125 See, pauweLyn (2002) p. 1, arguing that obligations under the wTO agreements are 
bilateral.
126 United Nations International Law Commission, Third Report on State Responsibility, p. 48
127 Ídem., p. 49, footnote 195.
128 It would be more accurate to say that the same ‘conduct’ amounts to as many breaches 
as obligations are so breached and, therefore, that a state affected by these breaches is 
injured in as many forms as obligations are breach as a result of the same ‘conduct’. This 
idea is expressed using the concept of breach in ídem., p. 50, illustrating the proposition 
that “it is possible for a State to be injured – for its legal interests to be affected – in a 
number of different ways in respect of the same breach”, through the reference to the 
single breach of an obligation erga omnes, namely being “the victim of an unlawful armed 
attack” and an obligation erga omnes partes, i.e., being the State of the vessel which is 
“denied the right of transit through an international waterway”.
129 United Nations International Law Commission Third Report on State Responsibility, p. 43, 
footnote 182.
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c) the conDitions For characterising an obLigation as an ‘obLigation ergA omneS 
pArteS’
Thus, in light of the foregoing, the conditions for the existence of, and, 
hence, for characterising an obligation as, an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ 
would be, according to the Court, three: (1) The existence of a treaty; (2) The 
existence of an obligation under the treaty; (3) The existence of ‘an interest’ in 
the performance of the obligation under the treaty on the part of ‘each State 
party’. The question as to the ‘common’ or ‘general’ character of such interest 
is discussed in further detail below, in connection with the legal consequen-
ces of the characterisation of an obligation as ‘obligations erga omnes partes’.
The two first conditions, as noted above, are implicit, the second one 
flowing from the Court’s statements. The third condition is the only pro-
perty explicitly predicated of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ in the Court’s 
definition.
The following sub-section studies the sources of ‘obligations erga omnes 
partes’ and the issues which may arise in this particular regard.
2. the source of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’
This section deals with issues which arise in relation to the source of 
‘obligations erga omnes partes’, including some of the problems discussed 
above, in relation to the definition and nature of such obligations.
a) treaties as a source oF an ‘obLigation ergA omneS pArteS’ anD the Law oF treaties
The Court, in its definition of, and in the statements made in connection 
with the characterisation of the obligations under Articles 6(2) and 7(1) of the 
Convention as, ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, implies that the source of such 
obligations are treaties.
The fact that the source of an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ are rules 
provided for in treaties implies that the scope of the obligation is determi-
ned by and coextensive with the scope of application of the relevant con-
ventional rule. The scope of application of the latter, in turn, is determined 
by the law of treaties, as codified in the vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (vCLT). In this sense, as has been stressed elsewhere, the primary 
nature of an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ is conventional and so is its legal 
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regime.130 Thus, ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ are, first and foremost, ‘erga 
partes’.
This is without prejudice to the fact that, insofar as Article 48(1)(b), which 
is regarded as adopting the concept of ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, does 
not expressly refer to treaties as a source of such obligations, it would be 
possible to posit the existence of customary ‘obligations erga omnes partes’, 
in which case the source would be a special customary rule, particularly of 
regional character.131
In particular, there are questions which arise in relation to the fact that 
treaties are the source of ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, including, i.a.: (a) 
whether both bilateral and multilateral treaties can create ‘obligations erga 
omnes partes’; (b) whether a treaty providing for reservations can create ‘obli-
gations erga omnes partes’; and (c) whether the existing law of treaties, as 
codified in the vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (vCLT), provides a 
basis for the concept of “community of States parties as a whole”, as noted by 
the ILC on its final Report on fragmentation of International Law.132
The ILC, in its final Report on fragmentation of International Law, su-
ggests that divergence in the field of treaty law could be “mitigated”, i.a., 
through the use of the distinction between “synallagmatic” and “integral or 
interdependent” treaties, the latter being characterised as “concluded erga 
130 It has been further suggested, in relation to ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, that such a 
legal regime would be set out by the ‘express and implied terms of the treaty of which they 
form part’. See, in this connection, tams (2010) p. 125.
131 Indeed, special customary rules of a regional character can create obligations “owed to 
a group of states”, including a state other than the one injured by a breach, and establish 
such obligations “for the protection of a collective interest of the group”.
132 United Nations International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, p. 
251, stating: “In general, the VCLT gives insufficient recognition to special types of treaties 
and the special rules that might go to interpret and apply them. More work here seems 
necessary. It is proposed to give guidelines on how the Vienna Convention provisions 
might give recognition to the wide variation of treaty types and normative implications of 
such types and whether it might be possible to set up informal guidelines on how to deal 
with treaty conflicts. At least the following themes might be part of such an effort: … (e) 
What it means for obligations to be owed “to the international community as a whole” 
(erga omnes obligations) or to the “community of States parties as a whole” (obligations 
erga omnes partes) should be further elaborated”.
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omnes partes”.133 The ILC, nonetheless, does not specify whether such ‘in-
tegral or interdependent treaties’ are only multilateral or may also extend to 
those that are bilateral.
Nevertheless, the ILC, in its work on the responsibility of states, as no-
ted in the reports submitted by the Special Rapporteur Crawford, accepted 
the proposition that, de lege lata, obligations erga omnes partes would only 
arise subject to two conditions, namely, “first to express stipulations, and se-
cond to such stipulations in multilateral treaties”, without prejudice to the fact 
that “general international law”, which is presumably of a customary natu-
re only, “parallels and reinforces a multilateral treaty provision in the public 
interest”.134
b) custom as a source oF ‘obLigations ergA omneS’ proper anD the concept oF 
‘obLigation ergA omneS pArteS’
There is consensus that the concept of ‘obligations erga omnes’ was set 
out in the Court’s judgment in the Barcelona Traction case.135 ‘Obligations 
erga omnes’ proper are defined, according to this judgment, as obligations 
owed by all states and other subjects of international law to the community.
In this regard, they may be considered as arising, primarily, under custo-
mary rules opposable to the entire community, namely ‘universal’ or ‘gene-
ral’ customary international law. This is usually not expressly pointed out, as 
133 United Nations International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Dif-
ficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the 
Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, para. 
472, stating: “The risk of divergence - a commonplace in treaty law - would be mitigated 
by making the distinction between “reciprocal” or “synallagmatic” treaties (in which case 
mere “divergence” in interpretation creates no problem) and “integral” or “interdepend-
ent” treaties (or treaties concluded erga omnes partes) where the use of that other treaty 
in interpretation should not be allowed to threaten the coherence of the treaty to be inter-
preted”.
134 United Nations International Law Commission, Third Report on State Responsibility, p. 
43.
135 Frowein (2008); see also the ILC, describing it as the locus classicus in this subject, United 
Nations International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682 , 13 April 2006, para. 387.
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customary international law is often assumed to be general and referred to, 
simply, as ‘general international law’.
The ILC, in its final Report on fragmentation of International Law, notes 
that the “distinction between “bilateral” and erga omnes obligations seems 
analogous to the domestic distinction between contracts and public law 
obligations”.136
Nonetheless, in spite of the primarily customary nature of obligations 
erga omnes proper, it has not been ruled out that such obligations may be 
created by treaties. This is, indeed, acknowledged by the ILC and the Institut 
de Droit International.137
Indeed, while, in practice, during and in connection with the process of 
conclusion of such multilateral treaty, customary rules may be formed and 
come into force before the multilateral treaty is concluded and enters into 
force, it cannot be excluded that the effect of the treaty, once it is universal, 
would create obligations ‘erga partes’ equal in their effects to obligations erga 
omnes proper.
In this regard, it must be noted that, to the extent that even universal 
treaties may be withdrawn from, the obligation would, still, remain merely 
‘erga partes’, its ‘erga omnes’ effect being only a matter of degree and, in par-
ticular, of the degree to which the treaty remains universal or general, which 
is contingent.
hence, the most prominent source of obligations erga omnes is, thus, 
custom, as noted above. Interestingly, Judge Tomka, in his previous capacity 
as member of the ILC, noted that “[t]he examples of obligations erga omnes 
partes given by the Special Rapporteur, particularly obligations in the field of 
the environment in relation to biodiversity or global warming, were par excel-
lence obligations for the benefit of all States, irrespective of whether they were 
parties to the relevant multilateral treaties”.138
136 United Nations International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of 
the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, para. 
395.
137 Ídem., para. 403.
138 United Nations International Law Commission, Summary record of the 2622nd meeting, 
para 50.
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3. the legal consequences of the characterisation of obligations as ‘obliga-
tions erga omnes partes’
The legal consequences of the Court’s use of the characterisation of an 
obligation as an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ are twofold, in the context of 
the judgment in the case at hand.
(a) first, the right to bring claims on the basis of the breach of an ‘obli-
gation erga omnes partes’ is predicated of any state party to the treaty, which 
implies that no other requirements must be fulfilled. This latter aspect, in par-
ticular, has two related, yet separate, implications, as follows:
(i) As for the invocation of responsibility, any state party to the treaty 
which constitutes the source of an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ is entitled 
to invoke responsibility. This right to invoke responsibility encompasses, but 
is not exclusively, confined to, the right to bring a claim on the basis of the 
breach of such obligation before a given international court or tribunal.
(ii) As for the ius standi to bring a claim in which responsibility is invoked 
for the breach of an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, any state party to the trea-
ty which constitutes the source of an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ has ius 
standi.
(b) Secondly, a claim arising from the breach of an ‘obligation erga om-
nes partes’ is admissible in relation to any party to the treaty, regardless of 
whether it was ‘specially affected’ or ‘injured’.
To the extent that issues of ius standi and admissibility of claims, leaving 
aside specificities governed by the applicable procedural rules, depend on 
the finding as to whether there is (1) a legal interest, or, in the Court’s terms, 
‘an interest’, in the performance of an obligation and (2) a right to invoke res-
ponsibility, this part will be confined to the study of these two latter elements.
A) the eXiStence of ‘An intereSt’ AS An element of the Definition of, AnD A conDition 
for the chArActeriSAtion of A conventionAl oBligAtion AS, ‘oBligAtion ergA omneS 
pArteS’ AnD itS relevAnce to the legAl conSequenceS of Such chArActeriSAtion
The right to react against breaches of treaty obligations is regarded by 
some commentators as arising from the respective treaty, not from the nature 
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of the obligation breached, particularly its alleged character as an ‘obligation 
erga omnes partes’.139
This would be illustrated, as noted by some of the judges sitting in the 
bench for the case in their statements, analysed above, by the lack of relevant 
state practice in the field of, for instance, inter-state proceedings before the 
human Rights Committee, as states need not demonstrate that their obligation 
is an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’, but simply that the treaty allows them be 
institute such proceedings.140
Indeed, some commentators have expressed that the question of identi-
fying an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ and distinguishing it from ‘obligations 
erga omnes’ is irrelevant, insofar as ‘a treaty expressly recognises a general 
legal interest or confers specific rights of protection’.141
In this connection, Judge Tomka, in his previous capacity as member of 
the ILC, pointed out that “the existence of a legal interest would be a question 
of the interpretation or application of the relevant primary rules”.142
b) the right to invoke responsibiLity For the breach oF an ‘obLigation ergA 
omneS pArteS’ oF any state party to the treaty which constitutes the source 
thereoF anD the scope oF such right oF invocation unDer the Law oF interna-
tionaL responsibiLity
Article 48 of the ILC ARSIwA is regarded as establishing the right to in-
voke responsibility for the breach of “an obligation erga omnes or erga omnes 
partes”.143
139 tams (2010) p. 125.
140 Ídem., p. 125, stating: “Their right to react against treaty breaches exists because the 
respective treaties say so, not because of some special status of the obligation breached” 
(footnotes in the original omitted).
141 Ídem., p. 125.
142 United Nations International Law Commission, Summary record of the 2622nd meeting, 
para. 50
143 gaja (2010) p. 12, stating: “Article 48 of the same Articles adds that in the case of breach 
of an obligation erga omnes or erga omnes partes any state is entitled to invoke the re-
sponsibility of another state; performance of the obligation to make reparation may then 
be requested ‘in the interest of the . . . beneficiaries of the obligation breached’. It is clear 
that those beneficiaries include individuals, for example when their human rights are in-
fringed”.
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The scope of “legal consequences legal consequences of the responsi-
bility of a State” “which differently affected States”, namely, those which are 
not “specially affected”, “may invoke” if the obligation breached is an “obli-
gation erga omnes partes” or an “obligation erga omnes” proper is almost 
identical.144
Indeed, the scope of the right encompasses the same legal consequen-
ces, except for the fact that in the event of “well-attested gross breaches” of 
“obligations erga omnes”, a “differently affected state” would be entitled to 
invoke the legal consequences of responsibility and adopt countermeasures 
“individually”, i.e., not on behalf of the specially affected state or by agree-
ment between all states.145
On the one hand, “injured states”, as a result of the breach of a bilateral 
obligation, and “specially” as well as “differently affected states” as a conse-
quence of the breach of a multilateral obligation, are entitled to directly seek 
“cessation” and “assurances of guarantees”,146 the minimum component of 
which is “the right to a declaration by a competent court or tribunal in respect 
of the breach”.147
On the other hand, while “injured states”, in the event of breach of a 
bilateral obligation, and “specially affected”, in the case of breach of a multi-
lateral obligation, may also directly seek the other elements of responsibility, 
namely restitution, compensation and satisfaction, and even have resort to 
countermeasures under the applicable conditions, “differently affected states” 
may only seek these other elements of responsibility “on behalf of the specia-
lly affected state” or “by agreement between the States parties”.148
The only distinction between states “differently affected” by the breach 
of an obligation erga omnes proper as opposed to states “differently affected” 
by the breach of an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ is whether the type of 
breach is a “well-attested gross breach”, which would only be predicable, in 
principle, of obligations erga omnes.
144 United Nations International Law Commission, Third Report on State Responsibility, par-
ticularly “Table 2”, p. 56, which allows to graphically appreciating the above proposition.
145 Ídem., p. 56.
146 Ibídem.
147 Ídem., footnote 213.
148 Ídem., p. 56.
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The difference, nonetheless, only arises in relation to resort to counter-
measures individually, i.e., not necessarily on behalf of the state specially 
affected or with the agreement of all the states.
CoNClUSIoNS
The present paper has sought to demonstrate that the concept of ‘obli-
gations erga omnes partes’, which it analysed in terms of its definition, na-
ture, sources and legal consequences of characterisations of an obligation 
as such, is, at best, redundant. In this sense, the present writer concurs with 
Judge higgins observation that “[t]he Court’s celebrated dictum in Barcelona 
Traction … is frequently invoked for more than it can bear”.149
Indeed, as discussed above, ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ are only of 
significance if they are ‘obligations erga omnes’ proper, primarily in the form 
of customary obligations under general rules customary international law, 
binding on the parties to the treaty qua custom and regardless of any reser-
vation, in addition to being binding on non-parties to the respective treaty to 
which the customary rule is opposable.
Therefore, as noted above, while the concept of obligation erga omnes 
proper, as set out in the dictum of the Court’s judgment in the barcelona 
Traction case is predicable of obligation in the performance of which all the 
states have a common interest, the existence of a ‘common interest’ in relation 
to conventional obligations, particularly those of a multilateral character may 
lead to the same consequences to which the existence of an obligation erga 
omnes proper leads, particularly as to ius standi and admissibility of claims, 
yet does not turn the respective obligation into a new form of obligation erga 
omnes, nor is it the legal basis for findings as to ius standi and admissibility of 
claims, which remain to find their legal basis on the existence of a common 
149 Cited in United Nations International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Re-
port of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 
2006, para. 398, footnote 559. It has been suggested that the concept of ‘obligations erga 
omnes partes’ is, in a way, the outcome of a commonly held view whereby obligations 
erga omnes are regarded as unique in nature, leading to the extension of their apparently 
unique quality of empowering ‘States to vindicate general interests’ to other areas. tams 
(2010) p. 308, referring to the above explanation for the use of the concept as ‘the myth 
of uniqueness’.
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interest in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Indeed, should such 
a legal basis exist under the treaty, the use of the concept of ‘obligation erga 
omnes partes’ is devoid of purpose, as the rationale for the use of the concept 
of erga omnes was to “close an enforcement gap”, which “is hardly necessary 
where a treaty expressly provides for standing in the public interest”.150
hence, the question is not whether an obligation is ‘erga omnes par-
tes’, which is likely to remain merely binding ‘erga partes’, or properly erga 
omnes, in which case there is no any need for a further characterisation, but 
whether the treaty, in practice always multilateral, although the Court did not 
expressly rule out bilateral treaties from its definition, as noted above, accords 
the “each” and, in addition to the Court’s definition, “every”, state party a le-
gally protected interest in the performance by each and every other state party 
of obligations under the treaty.
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